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The "Cooperative" /"Concentrative" 
Dilemma of EC Merger Control: A Review 
of Commission Policyi' 
Frank L. Fine* 
INTRODUCTION 
As the United States pulls out of its current recession, one may 
expect U.S. companies, whether large or small, to exploit the unified 
market of the European Community (EC), formed in 1993. This 
wave of new investment coincides with the deepening economic 
malaise in Europe, but companies on both sides of the Atlantic may 
profit from their differing business climates. U.S. companies will 
find that joint ventures may provide a low-risk means of entering 
new geographic markets. European firms, on the other hand, may 
find their own profitability increased by broadening their product 
ranges, reducing over-capacity, and sharing technology and marks 
with their U.S. partners. Joint ventures also may serve as a temporary 
structure for long-term objectives, such as the eventual merger of 
the two partners or the acquisition of the venture's assets. 
The EC Merger Control Regulation (MCR),! which entered into 
force on September 21, 1990, resulted in the EC antitrust clearance 
procedure applicable to certain joint ventures being simplified 
greatly. In effect, those "concentrative" joint ventures having a 
"Community dimension" fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
MCR, thereby preempting the European Commission's (Commis-
t Copyright © 1993 Frank L. Fine. 
* The author is the European Counsel at the Brussels office of Jaques & Lewis, a London 
based law firm. This paper was delivered in substantially the same form at the First Annual 
EC Merger Control Symposium organized by IBC Legal Studies and the Union Internationale 
des Avocats on 12-13 October 1992 in Brussels, Belgium. This article reflects legal develop-
ments until 31 August 1992. 
The author and editors of the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 
wish to express special thanks to Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, for lending an entire set of the EEC Merger Control Reporter for use in relation to the 
production of this article. Please note all Commission Decisions are reported in the EEC 
Merger Control Reporter. 
1 Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 
1990 OJ. (L 257) 14 [hereinafter MCR]. 
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sion) enforcement of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty or Treaty), and 
the intervention of the Member States' antitrust authorities.2 More-
over, such transactions normally are cleared within four weeks after 
the Commission has been notified.3 At first glance, the "Community 
dimension" requirement may appear difficult for many companies 
to satisfY. According to the MCR, the combined worldwide turnover 
of the undertakings concerned must exceed 5 billion ECU (U .S. 
$5.6 million) and each of at least two of the undertakings concerned 
must have EC-wide sales exceeding 250 million ECU (U.S. $282 
million).4 In practice, however, this requirement may not be as 
daunting as it seems because the turnover of the "undertakings 
concerned," for the purpose of this calculation, includes not only 
the parties to the joint venture, but also their subsidiaries, parent 
companies, and all other subsidiaries of the parent companies.5 
Once it is clear that ajoint venture has a "Community dimension," 
the focus turns to whether the joint venture is "concentrative" rather 
than "cooperative." This inquiry may appear somewhat metaphysical 
to U.S. lawyers, but it is taken seriously by the EC Merger Task Force 
(Task Force), which is responsible for resolving the issue in specific 
cases.6 The conceptual distinction between "concentrative" and "co-
operative" joint ventures is quite vague. The problem lies in the 
criteria established by the Commission and in the ebb and flow of 
its decisions, which seem to reflect the on-going turf battle between 
the Task Force and the section of Directorate General IV (DG IV) 
which retains responsibility for "non-concentrative" agreements and 
corporate behavior. Until now, with the broad scope given to "con-
centrative" ventures, the Task Force seems to be the power-broker 
in this affair. This, however, is understandably good news to notifYing 
companies. 
2 fd. arts. 21(1)-(2), 22(1)-(2). Article 85 prohibits agreements which have an appreciable 
effect on trade between Member States and competition within the EC or a substantial part 
of it, subject to the possibility of individual and group exemptions. See id. art. 85. Article 86 
prohibits the abuse of dominant position held in the EC or a substantial part of it insofar as 
it may affect trade between Member States. fd. art. 86. 
3 fd. art. 10(1). Formal decisions under articles 85 and 86, which are not subject to any time 
limitation, may take several years. Informal comfort letters may be obtained more rapidly, but 
companies are often wary of the fact that they do not bind the Commission. 
4 MeR, supra note 1, art. l(2)(a)-(b). 
5 fd. art. 5(4). 
6 The Merger Task Force, which is part of DG N, the Directorate General responsible 
for competition, consists of approximately 50 officials, most of whom are either lawyers or 
economists. 
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This paper will shed light on the distinction between "concentra-
tive" and "cooperative" joint ventures. Implicit in these terms is a 
common element ofa 'joint venture." Guidelines accompanying the 
MCR indicate that ajoint venture must satisfY two conditions: (i) the 
venture must constitute an "undertaking," which is (ii) jointly con-
trolled by two or more other undertakings. The test of whether a 
joint venture is "concentrative" is provided for in article 3(2) of the 
MCR, which states: 
[t]he creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting 
basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, 
which does not give rise to coordination of the competitive 
behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between 
them and the joint venture shall constitute a concentration 
within the meaning of paragraph 1 (b) .7 
This paper examines the definition of a "concentrative" joint ven-
ture, which is reducible to the following elements: (i) an "undertak-
ing" which is jointly controlled by two or more other undertakings 
(i.e., ajoint venture); (ii) such joint venture must be established on 
a lasting basis; (iii) the joint venture must perform the functions of 
an "autonomous economic entity" (i.e., a scrcalled "full-function" 
joint venture); and (iv) the joint venture must not lead, actually or 
potentially, to the coordination of the parties' market behavior inter 
se or between any of the parties and the joint venture. 
I. ELEMENTS OF A "CONCENTRATIVE" JOINT VENTURE 
A. joint "Undertaking" 
As in the case of "cooperative" joint ventures, a "concentrative" 
joint venture must be an undertaking jointly controlled by several 
other undertakings.s For these purposes, the Commission has 
defined an "undertaking" broadly as "an organized assembly of 
human and material resources, intended to pursue a defined eco-
nomic purpose on a long-term basis."9 In its MCR decisions on "con-
centrative" joint ventures, the Commission has not been obliged to 
determine the limits of this concept because most of the cases have 
involved the shared ownership of a pre-existing subsidiary or the 
7 These elements are elaborated upon in the Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative 
and Cooperative Operations, n 15-36, 1990 OJ. (C 203) 10. 
Bld.19. 
9Id.18. 
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establishment of a joint venture company. In several decisions, the 
Commission indicated that a partnership may satisfY the require-
ment of an undertaking,1O but the question remains whether the 
Commission, for the purposes of the MCR, will expand the scope 
of an undertaking to include collaboration not involving a jointly 
owned legal entity.n 
Historically, the Commission's policy has been that a "concentra-
tive" joint venture could not occur unless the parties placed certain 
activities in the joint venture and withdrew permanently from these 
fields of activity.12 While several MCR decisions involve the transfer 
10 See generally ABC/Generale des Earn/Canal + /WH. Smith TV, Comm'n Dec., 10 Sept. 
1991 (1 EEC Merger Control Rep.) (Kluwer L. & Tax'n Publishers, Cambridge, Mass.); 
Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991. 
11 Cf GEC-Weir Sodium Circulators, 1977 OJ. (L 327) 26, 31, 1 C.M.L.R. D42 (1978), in 
which the Commission held that a "cooperative" joint venture could arise "solely by contract." 
12This view dates back to 1976, when the Commission offered this definition of a partial 
merger: 
[e ]ven where the transfer of assets is limited only to a part of the total business 
previously engaged in independently by the parent companies, the transfer may in 
exceptional cases be treated in the same way as a merger. But such exceptional cases 
can be taken to arise only where the parent companies completely and irreversibly 
abandon business in the area covered by the joint venture, and provided that the 
pooling of certain areas of business does not weaken competition in other areas, and 
particularly in related areas, when the firms involved remain formally independent 
of each other. 
COMM'N, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1976), point 55. The above view of partial 
mergers was applied earlier in SHY/Chevron, 1975 OJ. (L 38) 14,15,1 C.M.L.R. D68 (1975) 
("what is really happening is that the distribution side of Chevron's and SHY's business is 
being integrated into the new trading structure of the [new] Calpam subsidiaries"). The 
requirement of total withdrawal has been reinforced in subsequent cases. In De Laval-Stork, 
De Laval, a U.S. turbine manufacturer, remained in the turbine business despite the estab-
lishment of a Dutch joint venture for the production and distribution of the product. 1977 
OJ. (L 215) 11,2 C.M.L.R. D69 (1977). The Commission held specifically that the production 
joint venture did not amount to a partial merger because this was "not the case that at least 
one of the companies has completely and irreversibly abandoned business in the area covered 
by the joint venture." 1977 OJ. (L 215) 11, 15-16. Similarly, in Iveco/Ford, Ford U.K. formed 
a joint venture with Iveco to take over Ford U.K.'s production of the Cargo line of heavy 
vehicles and to jointly distribute both Cargo and Iveco heavy vehicles in the United Kingdom. 
1988 OJ. (L 230) 39,4 C.M.L.R. 40 (1989). The Commission found that this joint venture 
was not "concentrative." As the Commission stated: 
[a]lthough the transfer of its previous heavy vehicle production to the]V means that 
Ford U.K. is withdrawing as a direct competitor, the Ford Group will continue to 
produce heavy vehicles in the relevant ranges in the United States and elsewhere 
overseas. Ford remains an important supplier there, and one which could also export 
to Europe. 
Id.1 24; see also Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, 1987 OJ. (L 41) 31,4 C.M.L.R. III (1988). In this 
case, Sofiltra of France and M.C. Engineering of the United Kingdom formed ajoint venture 
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of assets to a new joint venture and the withdrawal by the parents 
from the field,13 neither the MCR nor the guidelines14 would require 
such a transfer of assets or, for that maUer, that the parties perma-
nently withdraw from the field of the joint venture. Indeed, in its 
MCR decisions, the Commission, has shown great flexibility in carv-
ing out situations in which "concentrative" joint ventures may exist, 
thus blurring the line between not only "concentrative" and "coop-
erative" joint ventures, but also between "concentrative" joint ven-
tures and other types of concentrations. For example, in a large 
number of cases, the Commission has found that "concentrative" 
joint ventures resulted from the change in control of operating 
enterprises, such as one undertaking's acquisition of a co-control-
ling interest in another undertaking's subsidiary,15 even where the 
parties did not withdraw from the field of the jointly controlled 
for the manufacture and distribution of air filters using glass fibers. ld. The Commission held 
that this joint venture was subject to article 85(1) because Sofiltra would remain an inde-
pendent manufacturer of this product and was prohibited by the agreement from selling 
actively in the United Kingdom. ld. at 36. 
131n many cases both parties withdrew from the field of the joint venture. See generally 
Mitsubishi/UCAR, Comm'n Dec., 4 Jan. 1991; Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, Comm'n 
Dec., 2 Oct 1991; Drager/IBM/HMP, Comm'n Dec., 28 June 1991; Aerospatiale/MBB, 
Comm'n Dec., 25 Feb. 1991; Pechiney/ Usinor-Sacilor, Comm'n Dec., 24June 1991; Volvo/ At-
las, Comm'n Dec., 14Jan. 1992; Conagra/ldea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991; TNT/Canada 
Post, DBP Postdienst, La Poste, PIT Post and Sweden Post, Comm'n Dec., 2 Dec. 1991 
[hereinafter TNT/Canada Post]; Elf Atochem/Rohm and Haas, Comm'n Dec., 28 July 1992; 
Northern Telecom/Matra Telecommunication, Comm'n Dec., 10 Aug. 1992; Metallgesell-
schaft/Safic Alcan, Comm'n Dec., 8 Nov. 1991; Varta/Bosch, 1991 OJ. (L 320) 26 (but Varta 
would continue making batteries in related markets); Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser, Comm'n 
Dec., 18 Dec. 1991 (but parties remained in neighboring pump markets); Courtaulds/SNIA, 
Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991 (but parties would continue operations in related viscose and 
polyanIide markets). 
14The guidelines state that ajoint venture may be "concentrative" in at least four situations: 
(i) where the parents transfer certain activities to the joint venture; (ii) where the joint venture 
undertakes new activities on behalf of the parents; (iii) when the joint venture enters the 
parents' market; and (iv) where the joint venture enters a market which is upstream, down-
stream, or neighboring that of the parents. Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and 
Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 'I 24. Moreover, even in the first and third hypotheti-
cals, it is possible for the joint venture to be "concentrative" where the parent companies 
remain permanently active on the ]V's product or service market. ld. 'I 29. In these situations, 
however, the guidelines require that the geographic markets of the parents and the joint 
venture be separated to such extent that competitive interaction between these markets is 
precluded. ld. 
15 Such co-controlling interests in another undertaking'S subsidiary were acquired in many 
cases. SeegeneraUyMitsubishi/UCAR, Comm'n Dec., 4Jan. 1991;ASKO/Omni, Comm'n Dec., 
21 Feb. 1991; Conagra/ldea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991; Thomson/Pilkington, Comm'n 
Dec., 23 Oct 1991; Pechiney/Usinor-Sacilor, Comm'n Dec., 24 June 1991; Metallgesell-
schaft/Safic Alcan, Comm'n Dec., 8 Nov. 1991; Mondi/Frantschach, Comm'n Dec., 12 May 
1992; James River/Rayne, Comm'n Dec., 13 Feb. 1992; see alsoSaab Ericsson Space, Comm'n 
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entity.16 The Commission also has held that "concentrative" joint 
ventures could result from joint acquisitions of third undertakings,17 
including joint "rescue" operations by which a group of creditor 
banks would acquire their common debtor jointly.lS Even joint ven-
tures established to permit the parties to enter new product19 or 
geographic markets20 have been held to be "concentrative." 
B. Joint Control 
The main common element of "cooperative" and "concentrative" 
joint ventures is the joint control by the parents of the venture. The 
guidelines accompanying the MCR state that joint control exists 
''where the parent companies must agree on decisions concerning 
the ]V's activities, either because of the rights acquired in the]V or 
because of contracts or other means establishing the joint control. "21 
Conversely, the guidelines provide that joint control does not exist 
where one of the parents alone may dictate the joint venture's 
commercial activities.22 Broadly speaking, control is evaluated in 
Dec., 13 Jan. 1992. In this case, a "concentrative" joint venture resulted from an operation 
whereby Saab Space, a subsidiary of Saab-Scania Combitech (SSC) , would acquire Ericsson's 
space business and Ericsson would, in turn, obtain 40% of the shares in Saab Space, thus 
co-controlling Saab Space with SSC. [d. 'I 4. 
16 See, e.g., Thomson/Pilkington, Comm'n Dec., 23 Oct 1991, 1 9 (Thomson did not 
transfer any assets to the joint subsidiary and despite being in the same product market as 
the joint subsidiary, the Commission held that there was no likelihood of a coordination of 
their competitive behavior); see also Mondi/Frantschach, Comm'n Dec., 12 May 1992, 1 8. 
17 See, e.g., Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, Comm'n Dec., 2 Oct 1991; Elf/BC/CEPSA, 
Comm'n Dec., 18 June 1991; ABC/Generale des Earn/Canal + /W.H. Smith TV, Comm'n 
Dec., 10 Sept. 1991; UAP/Transatlantic/Sun Life, Comm'n Dec., 17 Nov. 1991; ASKO/Ja-
cobs/ ADIA, Comm'n Dec., 16 May 1991. 
IBKelt/American Express, Comm'n Dec., 20 Aug. 1991. 
19 See, e.g., Eucom/Digital, Comm'n Dec., 18 May 1992 (joint venture to provide a new 
information system for the management of freight operations was found "concentrative"); 
SPAR/Dansk Supermarked, Comm'n Dec., 3 Feb. 1992 (joint venture permitted SPAR to enter 
the "discount" food market). 
20 See, e.g., Dresdner Bank/Banque Nationale de Paris, Comm'n Dec., 4 Feb. 1991 (joint 
venture in Budapest would allow the two bank partners to finance trade with and investment 
in Hungary); BNP/Dresdner Bank (CSFR), Comm'n Dec., 26 Aug. 1991 (joint venture in 
Prague would allow the two bank partners to finance trade with and investment in Czecho-
slovakia); Gambogi/Cogei, Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991 (joint venture between two Italian 
construction firms to engage in building projects in Hungary); Ericsson/Kolbe, Comm'n 
Dec., 22 Jan. 1992 (joint venture between Ericsson of Sweden and Kolbe of Germany would 
introduce Ericsson's "digital cross-connect (DXC) technology" to the German market). 
21 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
1 11. 
22 [d. 'I 12. Conversely, where the minority shareholder has been offered more protection 
than that which is normally afforded to minority shareholders, this evidence would suggest 
that joint control exists. See Conagra/Idea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991,' 14; Elf/Enterprise, 
Comm'n Dec., 24July 1991, 14; Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser, 18 Dec. 1991,1 8. 
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accordance with four basic criteria: ownership of the joint venture 
assets; the right to appoint members of the managing and supervis-
ing boards; influence over the decisions of such bodies; and the 
right to otherwise manage-for example, by contract-the joint 
venture's business.23 
The MCR decisions shed light on the way in which the Commis-
sion interprets joint control. As a starting point, the Commission has 
held that joint control may be direct or indirect. For example, if 
Companies A and B form a jointly owned and controlled holding 
company, C, for the purpose of acquiring Company D, the Commis-
sion most likely would consider that D is jointly controlled by A and 
B, even though C has direct or indirect "sole" control ofD.24 On the 
other hand, where Companies A and B form a jointly owned and 
controlled consortium, C, and Company C together with Company 
D establish a 50-50 percent joint operating company, E, which has 
as one of its objectives the acquisition ofF, the Commission probably 
would consider whether E, rather than F, is controlled jointly be-
cause E will be characterized as the relevant joint venture.25 
A second interesting preliminary issue is whether all of the parent 
companies, in some way, must share in the decision-making affecting 
the joint venture. At first sight, such mandatory participation by 
each shareholder would not appear necessary because the only 
relevant dichotomy is between sole and joint, i.e., more than sole, 
control. The Commission confirmed this view in Gambogi/Cogei, in 
which Gambogi and Cogei, two Italian construction firms, formed 
23 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
'110. 
24 The hypothetical is based on UAP /Transatlantic/Sun Life, 17 Nov. 1991, where UAP and 
Transatlantic established a new holding company, Rockleigh, in which the two parents would 
hold equal voting rights. Rockleigh would, in turn, obtain a majority stake in Sun Life 
amounting to 59.9%. Furthermore, UAP and Transatlantic, presumably through Rockleigh, 
would have the right to appoint a total of six of Sun Life's 14 directors and to appoint the 
chairman, who was responsible for the daily management of the company. On these facts, the 
Commission concluded that Sun Life would be jointly controlled by UAP and Transatlantic 
through Rockleigh. See also ASKO/Jacobs/ ADIA, Comm'n Dec., 16 May 1991. 
25 The hypothetical is based on ABC/Generale des Eaux/Canal + /W.H. Smith TV, Comm'n 
Dec., 10 Sept. 1991. That case concerned a complex operation by which ESPN, a subsidiary 
of Capital Cities/ABC, GdI, a subsidiary of Generale des Eaux, and Canal + agreed to establish 
two partnerships in order to acquire the television interests ofW.H. Smith. The first partner-
ship would be co-controlled by CdI and Canal +. This initial partnership would then enter 
into a second venture with ESPN, which would be co-controlled by ESPN and the first venture 
(between CdI and Canal +). Lastly, the second venture would obtain sole control of W.H. 
Smith's television interests. In this case, the Commission considered that the second venture 
was the relevant operation since it constituted a "full-function, autonomous joint venture." Id. 
'I 8. The Commission concluded that the second venture was jointly controlled by ESPN and 
by the partners of the first venture, CdI and Canal +. Id. '1'1 16-17. 
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a 50-50 percent joint venture, CIU, in Italy for the sole purpose of 
creating a joint venture in Hungary with a Hungarian firm, BV.26 
The Italian consortium and BV would hold 51 percent and 49 
percent respectively of the voting rights in the Hungarian venture. 27 
To determine joint control of the Hungarian venture, the Commis-
sion considered that Gambogi and Cogei would be acting as a single 
shareholder, because the major decisions of CIU had to be taken 
unanimously.28 The Commission then held that Gambogi and Cogei, 
through CIU, would have joint control of the Hungarian joint ven-
ture, because CIU had a majority of seats on the board of directors 
and all decisions would be taken by a majority.29 The Commission 
concluded that this Hungarian operation amounted to a "concen-
trative" joint venture despite the presence of a party, BV, which did 
not exercise joint control with the Italian consortium.30 
On the other hand, where the parties intend to attract new share-
holders, the Commission may find that joint control is ephemeral 
and cannot form the basis of a "concentrative" operation. This view 
was expressed in EUREKO, in which four insurance companies each 
took an initial 25 percent stake in their new joint venture company 
but intended to attract a number of additional shareholders,3l All 
important decisions affecting the joint venture were to be taken by 
a simple or super majority (more than two-thirds) vote.32 The Com-
mission expressed its concern, however, that the eventual dilution 
of the four parties' shares may have resulted in a loss of joint 
control.33 Although this point was not decided definitively, the Com-
mission suggested that joint control, like the joint venture itself, 
must exist on a lasting basis.34 
The indicia of joint control are actually more complex than those 
listed in the MCR guidelines.35 The Commission generally examines 
a host of factors ranging from the relative share holdings of the 
26Gambogi/Cogei, Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991; see also ASKOjOmni, Comm'n Dec., 21 
Feb. 1991 (4% of shares in joint venture owned by third party); MetailgeselischaftjSafic Alcan, 
Comm'n Dec., 8 Nov. 1991 (Credit Lyonnais would own 4.49% of the shares in the joint 
venture and the general public would own 5.08% of the venture's shares). 
27 Gambogi/Cogei, Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991, '14. 
28 [d. , 5. 
29 [d. n 6-8. 
30 [d. 
31 See generaUy EUREKO, Comm'n Dec., 27 Apr. 1992. 
32 [d. , 10. 
33 [d. 'I 11. 
34 [d. " 11-12. 
35 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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parties and their voting power in the meetings of shareholders and 
directors, to the particular business decisions which they are capable 
of influencing. As a general proposition, a 50-50 percent joint 
venture with equal representation on the board of directors, by 
which a majority or unanimous vote would carry the resolutions of 
shareholders and directors, is deemed to be jointly controlled.36 For 
various reasons, however, the parties may allocate their respective 
shareholdings differently, with the result that the approval of the 
minority shareholder, whether at shareholder or director level, is 
necessary for all important decisions concerning the joint venture.37 
In such cases, the conclusion of joint control is inescapable. Clearly, 
the respective shareholdings of the parties are merely the starting 
point in the analysis of joint control. The key issue is the actual or 
potential influence which may be exercised by each party over the 
joint venture, which is essentially a function of voting rights and 
collateral agreements.38 
The Commission recognizes that certain decisions affecting the 
joint venture are more critical than others and therefore are more 
likely to confer joint control. For example, the consent of a parent 
to the joint venture's annual budget or business plan would appear 
sufficient, standing alone, to confer joint control.39 Other joint de-
36 See generally Mitsubishi/VCAR, Comm'n Dec., 4Jan. 1991; ASKO/Omni, Comm'n Dec., 
21 Feb. 1991; Metallgesellschaft/Safic Alcan, Comm'n Dec., 8 Nov. 1991; Courtaulds/SNIA, 
Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991; Steetley/Tarmac, Comm'n Dec., 12 Feb. 1992; SPAR/Dansk 
Supermarked, Comm'n Dec., 3 Feb. 1992. 
37 There have been numerous cases in which the minority shareholder reserved significant 
voting rights. The most striking examples are: Conagra/Idea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991 
(the two parties owned 74% and 26% of the relevant shares, but the minority shareholder, 
Conagra, maintained joint control of the venture by ensuring that a 75% majority vote was 
necessary for various key decisions); Apollinaris/ Schweppes, Comm 'n Dec., 24June 1991 (the 
two parties held 72% and 28% of the shares in a joint venture, but various important decisions 
required the approval of Schweppes, the minority shareholder); Varta/Bosch, Comm'n Dec., 
31 July 1991 (same protection afforded minority shareholder where shares were divided 
65%-35% between the two parents); Elf/Enterprise, Comm'n Dec., 24July 1991 (same result 
where shares were divided 66.6%-33.3%); Thomas Cook/LTV/West LB, Comm'n Dec., 14 
July 1992 (same result where shares were divided 76 %-14 % ). See also Elf Atochem/Rohm and 
Haas, Comm'n Dec., 28 July 1992 (in addition to their joint venture, the parents set up a 
jointly owned and controlled company, which would own 1 % of the shares in the joint venture; 
the remaining 99% of the shares to be split equally between the two parents; and the 1 % joint 
company was responsible for most major policy decisions, which would have to be taken by a 
majority vote). 
38 Influence also may be obtained by a voting agreement between shareholders. See 
TNT/Canada Post, Comm'n Dec., 2 Dec. 1991 (joint control would be exercised by one 
shareholder having 50% of the votes, together with five other shareholders holding cumula-
tively the remaining 50%, where these five minority shareholders would vote in block). 
39 See, e.g., Sunrise, Comm'n Dec., 13Jan. 1992 (consent on annual business plan apparently 
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cisions, in various combinations, also have been held to confer joint 
control. These include decisions in the following areas: significant 
investments or disposals;40 third party licenses;41 long-term strategic 
plans;42 changes in the objectives of the joint venture;43 increases in 
capital;44 loans;45 the payment of dividends;46 the launching of new 
products;47 marketing plans;48 the election of directors;49 the hiring 
of senior executives;50 and the termination of the joint venture.51 It 
would appear, however, that unless the parents must agree to the 
annual budget of the joint venture, the parties run the risk of the 
Commission finding that no joint control of the venture exists, even 
where several of the above decisions (apart from budget) must be 
taken jointly.52 
sufficient). In Conagra/Idea, the Commission stated that "the approval of the annual budget 
is especially important since it consists of a quantitative detailed expression of a plan of action 
summarizing the objectives of each department of the organisation (i.e. sales, production, 
distribution, and financing)." Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991, 'll12. Indeed, shareholder consent 
on the annual budget or business plan has been the factor most frequently cited by the 
Commission as an indication of joint control. See, e.g., Varta/Bosch, Comm'n Dec., 31 July 
1991 (annual budget); Conagra/Idea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991 (annual budget and 
business plan); Drager/IBM/HMP, Comm'n Dec., 28June 1991 (annual budget and business 
plan); Apollinaris/Schweppes, Comm'n Dec., 24 June 1991 (annual budget and long-range 
business plan); Ericsson/Kolbe, Comm'n Dec., 22Jan. 1992 (annual budget); Elf/Enterprise, 
Comm'n Dec., 24 July 1991 (annual budget); Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991 
(annual budget); Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser, Comm'n Dec., 18 Dec. 1991 (annual business plan); 
ElfAtochem/Rohm and Haas, Comm'n Dec., 28July 1992 (annual budget and business plan); 
Thomas Cook/LTV /West LB, Comm'n Dec., 14July 1992 (annual budget and five-year plan). 
40 See, e.g., Conagra/Idea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991 (significant investments); 
Drager/IBM/HMP, Comm'n Dec., 28 June 1991 (major investments and disposals); Thomas 
Cook/LTV/West LB, Comm'n Dec., 14July 1992 (major investments and proposals); Elf/En-
terprise, Comm'n Dec., 24July 1991 (oil and gas exploratory activity); Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n 
Dec., 9 Feb. 1991 (direct investments and acquisitions). 
41 Elf/Enterprise, Comm'n Dec., 24July 1991; Ericsson/Kolbe, Comm'n Dec., 22Jan. 1992. 
42 Apollinaris/Schweppes, Comm'n Dec., 24 June 1991; Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser, Comm'n 
Dec., 18 Dec. 1991. 
43 Driiger/IBM/HMP, Comm'n Dec., 28June 1991; Thomas Cook/LTV/West LB, Comm'n 
Dec., 14 July 1992; Elf Atochem/Rohm and Haas, Comm'n Dec., 28 July 1992 (modification 
of the bylaws). 
44 Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991. 
45 Apollinaris/Schweppes, Comm'n Dec., 24June 1991. 
46 See generally Elf Atochem/Rohm and Haas, Comm'n Dec., 28 July 1992; Thomas 
Cook/LTV/West LB, Comm'n Dec., 14July 1992. 
47 Conagra/Idea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991. Similarly, joint decisions on research and 
development have been held relevant to joint control. See generally Elf Atochem/Rohm and 
Haas, Comm'n Dec., 28 July 1992. 
48 Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991. 
49Varta/Bosch, Comm'n Dec., 31 July 1991. 
50Conagra/Idea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991. 
51 Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991. 
52 See PepsiCo/General Mills, in which PepsiCo retained the right to appoint four of the 
seven members of the board of directors of its joint venture with General Mills, with General 
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C. Lasting Basis 
The MCR states specifically that a joint venture is "concentrative" 
only if it is capable of performing on a "lasting basis. "53 The Com-
mission assesses the long-term staying power of the venture by ex-
amining several factors. First, the Commission will determine 
whether the joint venture is established on a long-term basis.54 In 
this regard, a duration of fifty years would appear adequate.55 Joint 
ventures established for an indefinite period, however, also have 
satisfied this test of longevity. 56 The more decisive issue is whether 
the investment of the parent companies in the venture is of such a 
"nature and quantity as to ensure the ]V's existence and inde-
pendence in the long term. "57 This almost always will be the case 
where the joint venture takes over certain activities from the parents 
and the parents withdraw entirely from the field occupied by the 
joint venture58 or from the European market.59 But absent total 
withdrawal, the Commission has indicated that the investment of 
substantial human and financial resources in the venture or its 
receipt of significant "know-how" from the parents may be sufficient 
to confer longevity.5O 
D. Autonorrwus Economic Entity 
One of the more difficult criteria to apply in practice to "concen-
trative" joint ventures is the MCR requirement that the joint venture 
Mills having the right to appoint only three of them. Comm'n Dec., 5 Aug. 1992. All decisions 
of the board, including the annual budget of the venture, had to be taken by a simple majority, 
except that a unanimous vote was necessary for acquisitions or divestitures where the purchase 
or sales price exceeded 5% of the net value of the joint venture's assets. Id. In the Commission's 
view, however, these latter provisions were for the sole purpose of protecting General Mill's invest-
ment and did not affect the conclusion that PepsiCo exercised sole control of the venture. Id. 
53 MCR, supra note 1, art. 3(2). 
54 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
117. 
55 SeeABC/Generale des Eaux/Canal +/W.H. Smith TV, Comm'n Dec., 10 Sept. 1991 (50 
years); SHV/Chevron, supra note 12, (50 years); see also Elf Atochem/Rohm and Haas, 
Comm'n Dec., 28July 1992 (99 years). 
56 See generaUy Mitsubishi/UCAR, Comm'n Dec., 4Jan. 1991; EUREKO, Comm'n Dec., 24 
Apr. 1992; Rh6ne-Poulenc/SNlA, Comm'n Dec., 10 Aug. 1992. 
57 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
'17. 
58 See, e.g., Volvo/Atlas, Comm'n Dec., 14Jan. 1992 (despite retained ability of either party 
to terminate the venture after five years); Courtaulds/SNlA, Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991; 
Ericsson/Kolbe, Comm'n Dec., 22 Jan. 1992. 
59 Sanofi/Sterling Drug, Comm'n Dec., 10 June 1991; Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991. 
60 See Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 
7,117. 
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perform "all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. "61 
The problem is due partially to the fact that the issue of autonomy 
overlaps somewhat with the test of "lasting basis" and the absence 
of coordination of competitive behavior. The other difficulty is 
that most of the MCR decisions have treated the question super-
ficially. Nonetheless, there are certain points which appear to be 
well-settled. 
As a starting point, the Commission decisions affirm the position 
ofthe MCR guidelines that ajoint venture cannot be an autonomous 
economic entity unless it is a "full-function" venture which acts as 
"an independent supplier and buyer on the market."62 This require-
ment ensures that the joint venture, as an undertaking, is distinct 
from its parents.63 This test implies that the joint venture would carry 
out the "full" range of functions normally attributed to a player in 
the market; that is, the development, production, and distribution 
of the relevant product.64 The test also assumes that the joint venture 
possesses the usual administrative apparatus of a fully-functioning 
company, i.e., that it has its own accounts, assets, staff, management, 
and board of directors.65 
The second attribute of an autonomous economic entity is its 
ability to exercise its own commercial policf6 or its independence 
from its parents for the maintenance and development of its busi-
ness.67 This test of "economic independence"68 is not satisfied where 
the joint venture obtains most of its supplies from its parents or vice 
61 MCR, supra note 1, art 3(2). 
62 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
'I 16; see, e.g., ABC/Generale des Eaux/Canal + /W.H. Smith IV, Comm'n Dec., 10 Sept. 
1991, 'I 8; UAP /Transatlantic/Sun Life, Comm'n Dec., 11 Nov. 1991, 'I 11; Metallgesell-
schaft/Safic Alcan, Comm'n Dec., 8 Nov. 1991, 'I 7; Saab Ericsson Space, Comm'n Dec., 13 
Jan. 1992, part III. 
63 Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991, 'I 11; Steetley/Tarmac, Comm'n Dec., 12 Feb. 
1992, '18. 
64Yarta/Bosch, Comm'n Dec., 31 July 1991, 'I 4; Elf Atochem/Rohm and Haas, Comm'n 
Dec., 28 July 1992. If the joint venture relies mostly on its parents or third parties as subcon-
tractors for production, however, this may indicate that the joint venture is not fully function-
ing and, therefore, that it is not an autonomous economic entity. See Flachglas/Vegla, Comm'n 
Dec., 13 Apr. 1992 (reliance on parents and subcontractors); Baxter/Nestle/Salvia, Comm'n 
Dec., 6 Feb. 1991, '16 (reliance on parents for R&D and production). 
65Yolvo/Atlas, Comm'n Dec., 14Jan. 1992, '17. 
66 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
'I 18. 
67Id. 'I 16. This test also assumes that the joint venture would set its own pricing policy. See 
Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991, 'I 12. 
68Yarta/Bosch, Comm'n Dec., 31 July 1992, 'I 4; Saab Ericsson Space, Comm'n Dec., 13 
Jan. 1992, part III. 
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versa,69 or where the joint venture substantially integrates its facilities 
into those of the parents.70 Likewise, the joint venture usually would 
be prevented from exercising its own commercial policy where the 
parties remain in the market of the joint venture or a market which 
is upstream, downstream, or related to the joint venture's market.71 
A joint venture, however, does not lose its status as an autonomous 
economic entity where it obtains a marginal portion of its supplies 
of the relevant product from a parent,72 or uses its parents' facilities 
for the distribution of products representing a small proportion of 
its total turnover.73 In addition, the commitment of the parties to 
supply the joint venture for a limited period with essential raw 
materials or components for the manufacture of the relevant prod-
uct does not limit the venture's autonomy, provided that the venture 
remains free to procure its supplies of such intermediate products 
from third party sources.74 Similarly, the parents' lease of certain 
premises to the venture does not affect the latter's autonomy where 
the venture owns the essential business assets, such as the plant, 
machinery, equipment, stock, and intellectual property.75 Nor is the 
autonomy of the joint venture compromised where the parent com-
panies license their "know-how" to the joint venture in perpetuity, 
even if the license was revokable upon bankruptcy or termination 
of the joint venture.76 The Commission also held that agreements 
whereby the parents provide the joint venture with "administrative 
support services" (such as tax and legal assistance) and technical 
assistance for a limited period would not jeopardize the venture's 
autonomy.77 
69 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
116. 
7°Id.1 18. 
7J Id. 1 19. See infra text accompanying notes 93-128. 
72Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991,1 12 (supplies of certain relevant products by 
Lucas to the joint venture only accounted for 1-2% of the venture's turnover). 
73Id. (sales through Lucas represented only 15% of the joint venture's total sales). 
74 See Rhone-Poulenc/SNIA, Comm'n Dec., 10 Aug. 1992, 1 5.2.1 (five-year supply arrange· 
ment); Elf Atochem/Rohm and Haas, Comm'n Dec., 28July 1992, 1 9(b) (non-exclusivity of 
supply arrangement was emphasized). 
75Courtaulds/SNIA, Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991, 1 8; Rhone-Poulenc/SNIA, Comm'n 
Dec., 10 Aug. 1992,1 5.2.1. 
76Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991,1 12; Elf Atochem/Rohm and Haas, Comm'n 
Dec., 28 July 1992, 1 9(b). But cf. Baxter/Nestle/Salvia, Comm'n Dec., 6 Feb. 1991, 1 6 
(licenses of patents, "know-how," and trademarks to joint venture for a 21-year period did not 
result in a durable change in structure because the licenses were terminable by mutual 
consent of the parents at any time). 
77 Courtaulds/SNIA, Comm 'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991, 1 8 (such assistance was provided for a 
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E. Absence of Coordination of Competitive Behavior 
The tailpiece of article 3(2) of the MCR provides that a joint 
venture is deemed "concentrative" when it does not "give rise to 
coordination of the competitive behaviour of the parties or between 
them and the joint venture." The Commission in fact applied this 
same test to "partial mergers" under article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 
Under the Treaty, the Commission found this test to be satisfied only 
by the parent companies' withdrawal from the field of the joint 
venture.78 Under the MCR, however, the Commission considerably 
expanded the types of joint ventures which may be deemed "con-
centrative." As noted, the Commission's guidelines confirm that a 
joint venture, depending upon the circumstances, may be consid-
ered "concentrative" regardless of whether the parents initially are 
involved in, or remain in, the field of the joint venture. 79 This new 
Commission approach has increased significantly the number of 
joint ventures deemed "concentrative"-indeed, of the first thirty-
three operations found to be "concentrative," only fourteen involved 
the parties' withdrawal from the market of the joint venture.80 The 
broad approach of the Commission, however, has complicated the 
analysis of the issues greatly and obscured the dividing line between 
"concentrative" and "cooperative" joint ventures. 
1. Legal Test 
The MCR guidelines state that a joint venture is not to be re-
garded as "concentrative" if, as a result of its establishment, it is 
"reasonably foreseeable" that the competitive behavior of a parent 
company or of the joint venture would be affected.81 For the most 
part, these competitive relationships are defined by the markets in 
which the parents and joint venture would be operating after the 
formation of the venture. This is not to say, however, that the intent 
of the parties is irrelevant. Indeed, the MCR guidelines state spe-
cifically that ajoint venture only can be considered "concentrative" 
five-year period); see also Rh6ne-Poulenc/SNIA, Comm'n Dec., 10 Aug. 1992, 'll 5.2.1 (the 
joint venture would be furnished electricity, equipment for the drainage of used water and 
vapor, security services, computerized services, plus legal and accounting services). 
78 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
79 See supra text accompanying notes 12-20. 
80 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
8! Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
'20. 
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if it does not have the "object or effect" of coordinating the com-
petitive behavior of the parties.82 
Neither the MCR guidelines nor the Commission decisions reveal 
whether an anti-competitive object alone would be sufficient to 
place a joint venture in the "cooperative" camp. Both logic and 
practice under article 85, however, would suggest that an anti-com-
petitive effect also must be reasonably foreseeable. In EUREKO, the 
only case in which the "object" of the joint venture has been con-
sidered, the Commission indeed did find that the transaction had 
both the object and effect of coordinating the competitive behavior 
of the parties.83 The anti-competitive "object" was derived from both 
the shareholders' agreement and the brief submitted to the Com-
mission.84 As a lesson for lawyers, the shareholders, which were four 
insurance companies, confessed in writing that the aim of the alli-
ance was to "achieve increasingly close co-operation and interde-
pendence" by ensuring that the existing and future shareholders 
would operate primarily in their domestic markets.85 
2. Framework for Assessing the Coordination of Competitive 
Behavior 
Four issues must be addressed in determining whether a joint 
venture may lead to the coordination of the competitive behavior of 
the parents or between one of them and the joint venture. (i) First, 
whether, as the result of the joint venture, both parents will have 
withdrawn permanently from the field of the joint venture; (ii) if 
the answer to (i) is negative in that one or more of the parents 
remains in the field of the joint venture (or where the joint venture 
establishes a new enterprise in the field of one or more of the 
parents), the issue becomes whether there is any "competitive inter-
action" between the geographic markets of the joint venture and the 
parent concerned. (iii) Where one or more of the parents is in a 
market which is upstream or downstream from, or neighboring that 
of the joint venture, the Commission would examine the potential 
for spill-over effects and inquire whether either parent may enter 
the product market of the joint venture. (iv) Lastly, the Commission 
will examine any continuing ''vertical'' relationships between the 
82Id. 
83 EUREKO, Comm'n Dec., 27 Apr. 1992,' 16(a). 
84Id. 
85Id. 
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parents and the joint venture, such as ongoing supply and distribu-
tion. 
a. Total Withdrawal of the Parent Companies: Merger of Certain 
Activities 
The Commission, in its enforcement of the MCR, has affirmed its 
historical position under article 85, that where the parties withdraw 
permanently from the field of the joint venture, and are not in 
markets upstream or downstream from, or neighboring that of the 
venture, there should be no risk of coordination of the competitive 
behavior between the parent companies or between a parent and 
the joint venture.86 The MCR decisions, however, have added a good 
deal of gloss to this basic test, particularly on the effect of a party's 
failure to withdraw and the issue of when withdrawal is considered 
permanent. The rationale behind the withdrawal concept is to en-
sure that the competitive relationships between the parties them-
selves, and between the parties and the joint venture are not dis-
torted in the wake of the joint venture.87 As a consequence, if one 
assumes that a joint venture has two parents, X and y, and X with-
draws from the field of the joint venture, and Y never has operated 
in the venture's market or in an upstream, downstream, or related 
market, this should not impede a "concentrative" result.88 Further, 
even ifY remains in the same or related market as the joint venture, 
the Commission may find that there is no competitive interaction 
between the geographic markets in which Yand the joint venture 
would be operating.89 
Where the withdrawal of a parent is relevant to identifying the 
joint venture as "concentrative," the key issue is whether the with-
drawal is permanent.90 The MCR guidelines have borrowed, as a test 
of permanence, the concept of potential competition as established 
in the Commission's practice under article 85.91 For these purposes, 
the critical question is whether the withdrawing parent is capable of 
re-entering the market. According to the guidelines, a joint venture 
86 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
87 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
1: 20. 
88 See, e.g., Conagra/Idea, Comm'n Dec., 30 May 1991. 
89 See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text. 
90 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
1: 25. 
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would be presumptively "cooperative," i.e., "non-concentrative," if 
the withdrawing party's re-entry in the field was "a realistic option 
and represent[ed] a commercially reasonable course in the light of 
all objective circumstances."92 
In practice, the likelihood of re-entry or, conversely, the perma-
nence of withdrawal, largely depends on the existing economic, 
legal, and technical barriers. Examples of permanent withdrawal 
include the Thomson/Pilkington case, and the Driiger/IBM/HMP 
case.93 In Thomson/Pilkington, pursuant to its joint venture with 
Thomson, Pilkington would transfer to the joint venture its entire 
optronics business, including patents and "know-how." In the view 
of the Commission, it was not likely that Pilkington would re-enter 
this market because: (i) the technology evolved rapidly, which would 
pose a high technological barrier to a company having abandoned 
the field; (ii) a period of five to seven years would be needed for a 
new optronics product to become profitable; (iii) a group of highly-
qualified scientists and technicians would have to be identified and 
hired; and (iv) substantial investment would be necessary to build 
and equip a suitable plant. 
In Driiger/IBM/HMP,94 Drager, IBM and HMP formed a joint 
venture to develop and market hospital software which would link 
patient data with medical workstations. Both Drager and HMP 
would transfer their relevant assets to the joint venture. IBM had 
withdrawn from manufacturing biomedical systems in 1984 and its 
hospital software subsequently was limited to general information 
systems. In the Commission's view, it was not likely that IBM would 
re-enter the field of the joint venture even though it possessed the 
technical and financial means to do so. In part, the Commission 
relied upon IBM's withdrawal in 1984. The Commission also 
stressed, however, the commercial improbability of IBM's re-entry 
due to the substantial costs of developing such software for what was, 
in reality, a limited market. 
Apart from economic, legal, and technical barriers, there are 
several other factors relevant to determining whether a withdrawal 
from the market is permanent. As indicated in Driiger/IBM/HMP, 
the Commission may attach importance to an undertaking's earlier, 
independent decision to withdraw when it lacks an economic means 
or incentive to remain in the market. Additionally, the Commission 
92 [d. 
93Thomson/Pilkington, Comm'n Dec., 23 Oct. 1991. 
94Driiger/IBM/HMP, Comm'n Dec., 28June 1991. 
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may consider whether non-competition clauses in the agreement 
reinforce the permanent or ephemeral nature of the party's with-
drawal. It would appear, for example, that where a joint venture is 
established on a lasting basis, a clause preventing a parent from 
competing with the joint venture during the duration of the party's 
participation in the venture95 or for an indefinite period96 would 
support the determination of permanent withdrawal. On the other 
hand, if the clause prohibits competition with the venture for only 
several years,97 or allows one parent to re-enter the market of the 
venture with the consent of the other parent or the venture,9S the 
Commission has found that this indicates a lack of intent to with-
draw from the field of the venture. 
b. Parents' Partial Withdrawal from the Market 
Where one or both of the parents of a joint venture fail to with-
draw entirely from the field of the joint venture, it is possible that 
the parties, inter se or in relation to the joint venture, remain actual 
or potential competitors. As the Commission noted in its MCR 
guidelines, however, the potential for the coordination of competi-
tive behavior may be remote, even in these circumstances, depend-
ing on the "competitive interaction" of the geographic markets in 
which the parties are operating.99 In such cases, the possibility that 
a joint venture may be "concentrative" would not be excluded. As 
noted in the MCR guidelines, however, "the markets in question 
must be so widely separated, or must present structures so different, 
that, taking account of the nature of the goods or services con-
cerned and of the cost of (first or renewed) entry by either into the 
other's market, competitive interaction may be excluded. "100 Several 
fact scenarios may constitute partial withdrawal. First, Parent X may 
transfer some of its activities to the joint venture, but retain other 
95 Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser, Comm'n Dec., 18 Dec. 1991, 'l[ 10. 
96 See, e.g., Mitsubishi/UCAR, Comm'n Dec., 4Jan. 1991, 'l[ 8; Conagra/Idea, Comm'n Dec., 
30 May 1991, n 8,15; ASKO/Omni, Comm'n Dec., 21 Feb. 1991, n 4,6; Volvo/Atlas, 
Comm'n Dec., 14Jan. 1991, 'l[ 9. 
97 See Herba/IRR, Comm'n Dec., 28 Apr. 1992, 'I 9 (agreement of parent not to compete 
with joint venture for five-year period reinforced the "cooperative" nature of the venture). 
But cj Drager/IBM/HMP, Comm'n Dec., 28 June 1991, 'l[ 12, in which an 18-month non-
competitive clause was found to have reinforced the "concentrative" nature of the operation. 
98 EUREKO, Comm'n Dec., 27 Apr. 1992, 'l[ 16(b). 
99 Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, 
'l[ 29. 
100 [d. 
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operations in the field of the venture. In this first setting, Parent X 
indeed may be said to have withdrawn partially, even where Parent 
Y has transferred its relevant activities to the joint venture and 
withdrawn permanently. In the second scenario, however, Parent Y 
would have transferred its relevant activities to the joint venture 
(so-called permanent withdrawal), but Parent X would not have 
transferred any activities in the field of the joint venture to the 
venture. 
In each of the above scenarios, the test applied by the Commission 
is whether there is competitive interaction between the market of 
the joint venture and that of the parent which has not withdrawn 
permanently. In practice, this test functions very much like the test 
of "permanent" withdrawal, which is essentially the familiar concept 
of potential competition. As will be shown in the following examples, 
barriers to entry are critical to these evaluations, although a parent's 
past abandonment of activities in the market of the joint venture 
also may be relevant. 
In Lucas/Eaton, a joint venture between Lucas and Eaton was 
intended to combine their assets in heavy duty braking systems. IOI 
Lucas, however, would continue manufacturing most of these prod-
ucts in the United States.102 The Commission nevertheless held that 
Lucas was unlikely to re-enter the EC market because (i) due to 
technical differences between such systems in the United States and 
the EC, Lucas's products were not "directly and immediately substi-
tutable for those in the Community;"I03 and (ii) in the late 1970s, 
Lucas had attempted to market heavy duty braking systems in the 
EC, but failed and withdrew. 
Similarly, in Sanoji/Sterling Drug, Sanofi and Sterling Drug were 
to combine their ethical and over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceuti-
cal operations.104 Although the OTC venture did not include Ster-
ling Drug's U.S. operations (where a majority of its sales occurred), 
the Commission concluded that there was no realistic possibility of 
Sterling Drug re-entering the EC market. The Commission's ration-
ale was that Sterling Drug had transferred all of its European OTC 
assets, including trademarks and product registrations to the joint 
venture.105 This transfer legally did not prevent Sterling Drug from 
101 Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Dec. 1992. 
102 [d. 1 37(a). 
103 [d. 
I04Sanofi/Sterling Drug, Comm'n Dec., 12 Feb. 1992,19. 
105 [d. 
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exporting the same OTC products to the EC under different trade-
marks, however, as pharmaceuticals often become OTC products 
precisely because they are no longer patented. Therefore, one must 
presume that the Commission relied upon trademark loyalty as an 
economic barrier to the marketing by Sterling Drug of competing 
OTC products in the EC. 
The Commission found additional barriers to entry which pre-
cluded the coordination of competitive behavior where the parent 
concerned continued operating in the field of the joint venture 
either from a distant or adjoining geographic market. Examples 
include: (i) a construction firm would be impeded by high transport 
costs from shipping bricks from the United States to the United 
Kingdom;106 (ii) a French defense contractor was not likely to com-
pete with a joint venture formed with Pilkington and intended to 
operate in the U.K. market due to the U.K.'s "local" procurement 
patterns;107 (iii) a French composite insurer (i.e., providing life and 
non-life coverage) was not likely to compete with a U.K.-based joint 
venture formed to provide life coverage due to the structural barri-
ers posed by the United Kingdom to foreign life insurers, which 
would have involved substantial time and costs to overcome;108 (iv) 
a Brazilian affiliate of a French textile manufacturer was unlikely to 
export polyamide thread and fiber to the EC and thereby compete 
with the joint venture due to the need for physical proximity to 
clients and to a 9 percent Community tariff barrier;109 and (v) U.K. 
and German travel operators were not likely to compete with each 
other due to cultural barriers, such as the language differences of 
the countries concerned, and the added cost to the consumer of 
booking voyages in another countryYo 
On the other hand, where the partial withdrawal of the parent 
106Stee tley/Tarmac, Comm'n Dec., 12 Feb. 1992, ~ 9. This was presumably the rationale 
for the Commission's holding in Mondi/Frantschach, regarding the import of wood pulp into 
the EEC from South Africa. See Mondi/Frantschach, Comm'n Dec., 12 May 1992, ~ 21. 
107 Thomson/Pilkington, Comm'n Dec., 23 Oct 1991, 1 21; see also Elf/BC/CEPSA, 
Comm'n Dec., 18 June 1991. In Elf/BC/CEPSA, the Commission found that the nominal 
presence of Elf in the Spanish oil market did not pose a risk of coordination with its Spanish 
joint venture within the context of the restructuring of a state-controlled industry. Comm'n 
Dec., 18 June 1991, ~ 2. 
108UAP/Transatlantic/Sun Life, Comm'n Dec., 17 Nov. 1991,115. Cf EUREKO, Comm'n 
Dec., 27 Apr. 1992, ~ 16(b), in which the Commission found that barriers did not exist as 
regards large-risk non-life insurance since industrial companies "do not depend necessarily 
on national insurance companies." 
109 Rh6ne-Poulenc/SNlA, Comm'n Dec., 10 Aug. 1992,1 6.3. 
110 Thomas Cook/LTU/West LB, Comm'n Dec., 14July 1992, ~ 10. But it should be noted 
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leaves it not only in the product market of the joint venture, but also 
without significant geographic barriers to entry, it is highly unlikely 
that the joint venture would be considered "concentrative." This was 
essentially the Commission's conclusion in Apollinaris/Schweppes, in 
which Brau and Brunnen (BB) of Germany and Cadbury Schweppes 
(CS) of the United Kingdom formed ajoint venture to produce and 
distribute soft drinks and mineral water beverages, which both par-
ents had been producing.l11 The joint venture would have produced 
and marketed certain ofBB's brands in Germany, Austria, and other 
European markets, and CS's brands in Germany and Austria. Both 
BB and CS, however, intended to transfer only part of their soft 
drink and mineral water businesses to the joint venture. BB would 
remain in both the product and geographic markets of the joint 
venture, whereas CS would transfer its German and Austrian bever-
age business to the joint venture, but would sell mineral water and 
soft drinks independently in the remainder of the Community. Due 
to the nature of these products and the absence of significant bar-
riers facing them, the Commission held that CS had "the realistic 
option to re-enter the German market."112 Since this situation could 
have led to the coordination of the parties' competitive behavior 
inter se and with the joint venture, the operation was not deemed 
"concentrative. "113 
c. Establishment of a New Enterprise 
Under the Commission's broadly-framed MCR guidelines, ajoint 
venture to establish a new enterprise may be considered "concentra-
tive," provided it satisfies all of the elements of the article 3(2) 
tailpiece. ll4 Where the parties intend to expand rather than combine 
their existing activities, however, their withdrawal from the field of 
the joint venture is not expected. Nevertheless, the Commission 
believes that coordination of the competitive conduct of the parties 
and joint venture may be ruled out in these situations provided that 
the joint venture is established in a geographic market which has no 
that Thomas Cook, the U.K. parent, however, did have a minor presence in Germany. This 
fact undercut the Commission's holding that the alleged barriers prevented travel operators 
from doing business in other parts of the Community. 
III AppollinarisjSchweppes, Comm'n Dec., 24June 1991, , S. 
112 Id. , 9. 
113Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 
7,,, 31-32. 
114Id. , 31. 
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"competitive interaction" with that of the parents. JJ5 This test, as was 
shown earlier, is applied by the Commission in cases of partial 
withdrawal. 
In this context, the Commission has focused on the unique com-
petitive conditions existing in the joint venture's geographic market 
of, and on, barriers to entry. For example, in BNP/Dresdner Bank 
(CSFR) , Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) and Dresdner Bank es-
tablished a joint venture for the financing of trade with and invest-
mentin CzechoslovakiaY6The Commission observed that the Czech 
government imposed unique conditions for establishing foreign 
banks, which were the result of the gradual privatization of its state-
controlled economy.ll7 Since these legal barriers effectively would 
have precluded market entry by the parent banks outside the frame-
work of the joint venture, the Commission ruled out the possibil-
ity of a coordination of their competitive behavior either between 
themselves or the joint ventureYs 
Conversely, where there are no real barriers separating the par-
ents' market and their joint venture, the venture may be "coopera-
tive" in character. For example, in BSN-Nestli/Cokoladovny, BSN and 
Nestle formed ajoint venture in Czechoslovakia for the production 
and distribution of biscuits, candy (sugared and chocolate), and 
chocolate.1l9 The Commission did not indicate that barriers existed 
in Czechoslovakia which would have prevented BSN and Nestle from 
exporting products there in direct competition with the joint ven-
ture. Moreover, although the joint venture was, at the time, unlikely 
to export to the EC due to differences between Czechoslovakia and 
the EC in tastes and standards, these barriers gradually would be 
removed. Therefore, the Commission could not exclude the possi-
ble coordination of the competitive behavior of the parents and the 
joint venture. 120 
115 Id. 
116BNP/Dresdner Bank (CSFR), Comm'n Dec., 26 Aug. 1991. 
117 Id. ,. 4. 
118Id.; see also Gambogi/Cogei, Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991. In this decision, the estab-
lishment of a Hungarian joint venture by two Italian construction firms for the purpose of 
penetrating the Hungarian building market was held not to pose a risk of coordination of 
competitive behavior. Id. ,. 8. Cj Elf/BC/CEPSA, Comm'n Dec., 18 June 1991. 
119 Comm'n Dec., 17 Feb. 1992. 
120Id.1: 14. 
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d. Establishment of joint venture in the Market of the Parent 
Companies 
23 
Another potential scenario arises where the joint venture is estab-
lished within the geographic market of the parents to perform 
virtually the same activities as the parents. In these situations, the 
potential coordination of competitive behavior is presumed. An 
example of the Commission's approach was provided in Elf/Enter-
prise, in which Enterprise Oil of the United Kingdom sought to 
obtain joint control with Elf Aquitaine ofE.E. Petroleum (EEP), Elfs 
U.K subsidiary.l2l Both Enterprise and Elf would remain active in 
the market of their joint subsidiary, which was to explore, produce, 
and market crude oil and natural gas. Moreover, both parent com-
panies held licenses to engage in these activities in the geographic 
market of the joint venture, the U.K section of the North Sea. In 
view of the potential coordination of the parents' competitive con-
duct, the Commission held that the joint venture was not "concen-
trative. "122 
On the other hand, the Commission has held that a joint venture 
may operate in the same product and geographic markets of a 
parent company, without posing a risk of market coordination be-
tween the joint venture and parent, where the parent's sales in the 
geographic market of the joint venture have been nominal histori-
cally, and it would be commercially impractical for the parent to 
compete with its own joint venture. This point was illustrated in 
Mondi/Frantschach, in which the Hartmann/Kaufmann family of 
Austria and Mondi Holding, a German subsidiary of Mondi Paper 
Company Limited of South Mrica, entered into an agreement, 
whereby Mondi Holding would obtain 50 percent of the shares 
of Frantschach, which was controlled by the Hartmann/Kaufmann 
family.123 The Hartmann/Kaufmann family would then withdraw 
from the paper and pulp businesses because these activities, which 
121 Elf/Enterprise, Comm'n Dec., 24 July 1991. 
122Id.1: 6; see also Sunrise, Comm'n Dec., 13 Jan. 1991, 'l[ 30 (a five-way joint venture to 
obtain joint control of Sunrise Television of the United Kingdom was found not to be 
"concentrative" because some of the parent companies were active in the market of the joint 
venture); DuPont/Merck, Comm. Press Release IP(91)381, 6 May 1991 (Merck remained in 
the field of its pharmaceutical joint venture with DuPont, which led the Commission to 
conclude that the joint venture was "cooperative"). In Baxter/Nestle/Salvia, Comm'n Dec., 6 
Feb. 1991, 'l[ 9, the Commission found that the parents also may remain in the market of their 
joint venture, thereby preventing it from being "concentrative," where these activities are 
conducted through an earlier, continuing joint venture between the same parents. 
123 Supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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previously had been undertaken by Frantschach, were assimilated by 
the joint venture.124 But Mondi Paper did not intend to transfer its 
activities to the joint venture, resulting in Mondi Paper remaining 
in the paper and pulp businesses. This raised the issue of whether 
Mondi Paper was a potential competitor of the joint venture. The 
Commission concluded that such a risk did not exist because Mondi 
Paper's exports of pulp to the Community amounted to less than 2 
percent of all EC pulp sales, and it was more "reasonable to suppose 
that Mondi [would] develop its future European operations through 
the joint venture."125 
e. joint Venture operates in Upstream, Downstream, or Neighboring 
Market 
The absence of coordination of the competitive conduct of the 
parties or between them and the joint venture in the joint venture's 
product market does not preclude the possibility of such coordina-
tion in markets upstream, downstream, or neighboring that of the 
joint venture.126 Where the parents are competitors in a market 
upstream or downstream from, or neighboring that of the joint 
venture, the Commission applies its traditional doctrine of spill-over 
effects.127 In these cases, the parents' explicit or tacit exclusion of 
these related fields from the activities of the joint venture has been 
held to amount, in itself, to an allocation of markets between the 
124Mondi/Frantschach, Comm'n Dec., 12 May 1992, t 7. 
125Id. t 8; see also Elf/BC/CEPSA, Comm'n Dec., 18 June 1991, t 17 (no risk of coordina-
tion between Elf and CEPSA, despite nominal sales of each party in the home market of the 
other); Generali/BCHA, Comm'n Dec., 6 Apr. 1992, t 21 (minor presence and market share 
of Generali in Spain did not pose risk of coordination with Spanish joint venture). 
126Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 
7,1:1:34-36. 
127The Commission held that for the purpose of article 85(1), competition between the 
parties to ajoint R&D or production agreement may be restricted implicitly outside the field 
of the agreement. Such "spill-over" or "group" effects require that two or more of the parties 
continue to operate in a market which is upstream or downstream from, or neighboring that 
of the agreement, or the joint venture. As the Commission explained in GEC/Weir Sodium 
Circulators: 
[tlhe existence of a joint venture in one field is likely to provide opportunities and 
inducements to parent companies, who each have related interests also in other 
areas, to enlarge their common activities and impair free competition between them 
in those areas .... Through their continuing association with each other within the joint 
venture, the coincidence of interests of the parties in other areas can be expected to lead to 
an impairment of competition between them also in these other areas. 
1977 OJ. (L 327) at 32 (emphasis added). 
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parents and the joint venture. 128 Where the parents are not competi-
tors in an upstream, downstream, or neighboring market, the Com-
mission nevertheless may examine whether the operation of a par-
ent and the joint venture in related product markets may lead to 
the coordination of their market behavior. For example, the Com-
mission may examine whether the products of a parent and the joint 
venture compete with each other and, if so, whether there is com-
petitive interaction between their geographic markets. Specifically, 
the Commission may examine whether the parent potentially may 
enter the geographic market of the joint venture. 
In considering whether the products of a parent and the joint 
venture compete with each other, the Commission may examine 
several factors, such as the varying conditions of competition for 
the products,129 their technical differences,130 their complementary 
value,131 and, it would appear, differences in consumer demand.132 
In short, the Commission has availed itself of the various tools that 
it traditionally has employed under articles 85 and 86 in ascertaining 
the scope of the product market. 
If the products of a parent and the joint venture do not compete 
with each other, and it must be determined whether the parent 
concerned may enter the product market of the joint venture, the 
Commission examines whether there are any economic, legal, and 
technical barriers existing. An interesting example of the test was 
provided in Herba/IRR, in which Herba, part of a leading Spanish 
128 Baxter/Nestle/Salvia, Comm'n Dec., 6 Feb. 1991,1 9. 
129 Lucas/Eaton, Comm 'n Dec., 9 Feb. 1991. In this decision, the Commission held that the 
conditions of competition differed between the joint venture's market for heavy-duty braking 
systems and in the car brake market, in which the parents remained active. Id. 1 16. As noted 
by the Commission: "[t]he market for braking systems for cars requires large volumes of 
standardized product, whereas the heavy duty market requires lower volumes of production 
with a much higher degree of flexibility. Customers split operationally their car and truck 
activities into separate divisions." Id. 
Il!O Id. 'I 17 (difference in laden and unladen weight between cars and trucks has led to 
different braking systems for these two types of vehicles); see also Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser, 
Comm'n Dec., 18 Dec. 1991,1 9 ("niche" pump operations retained by the parents did not 
compete with industrial pump activities of the joint venture). 
131 Thomson/Pilkington, Comm'n Dec., 23 Oct 1991,1 12(a) (the Commission concluded 
that the optronics products of the joint venture and the high-technology products manufac-
tured by Thomson, one of the parents, were complementary, and this was a factor in the 
Commission's holding that there was no danger of market coordination between these two 
parties). 
132ABC/Generale des Eaux/Canal +/W.H. Smith TV, Comm'n Dec., 10 Sept. 1991, 1 9(a) 
(Commission held that pay and free-access television were distinct product markets since the 
former, due to the requirement of a subscription fee, is tailored to the needs of specific 
audiences). 
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agro-food group, Bro-Agricolas, planned to acquire 50 percent of 
IRR, an Italian firm which was part of the Feruzzi Group.133 Herba 
involved itself mainly in the processing and marketing of rice, and 
hoped to expand these activities through IRR, which, prior to the 
joint venture, involved itself in cereals other than rice. In evaluating 
the potential coordination between the Feruzzi Group and the joint 
venture, the Commission observed that Feruzzi would remain in the 
cereal market, but that it foreseeably could enter the rice market 
independently.l34 In this regard, the Commission cited Feruzzi's 
financial strength, the "modest" entry requirements, and the avail-
ability of necessary assets through acquisition in the market. As a 
result, the acquisition was deemed to be "non-concentrative."135 
f. Continuing Vertical Relationships 
The MCR guidelines on "concentrative"/"cooperative" arrange-
ments briefly allude to supply and distribution links between the 
parents and the joint venture as potentially leading to the coordina-
tion of their competitive behavior.136 Far from defining when such 
arrangements may preclude a "concentrative" joint venture, the 
guidelines actually risk confusing companies on the ancillarity of 
such links.137 Indeed, the MCR guidelines regarding ancillary restric-
tions should be viewed as providing a limited tolerance of links 
which do, to some extent, involve parent joint venture coordination. 
133Comm'n Dec., 28 Apr. 1992; see also Northern Telecom/Matra Telecommunication, 
Comm'n Dec., 10 Aug. 1992,1: 10 (no danger of coordination existed between the telecom-
munications joint venture concerned and a pre-existing venture between one of the parents, 
Matra, and a third party, Ericsson, for the provision of public digital switching in France, 
because France Telecom's demand was satisfied by the existing Matra-Ericsson supply arrange-
ment). 
134Herba/IRR, Comm'n Dec., 28 Apr. 1992, 'I 10. 
135Id. But see Varta/Bosch, Comm'n Dec., 31 July 1991; Courtaulds/SNlA, Comm'n Dec., 
19 Dec. 1991. In these cases, the Commission found that there was no danger of coordination 
resulting from the parent companies remaining in related markets since they were not in the 
relevant product market of the joint venture. 
136Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 
7, n 28,35. 
137With regard to joint ventures that take over pre-existing activities of the parents, the MCR 
guidelines state that the parents should be allowed a "short transitional period" not normally 
exceeding one year to overcome bottlenecks in production or supplies. Id. 1: 28. As regards 
joint ventures operating in upstream, downstream, or neighboring markets, the guidelines 
state that where the parents are not competitors, there may exist a risk of market coordination 
between the parents and joint venture where the joint ven ture' s sales or purchases are made 
in "substantial measure" with the parent companies. Id. 'I 35. It should be noted that the 
guidelines do not deal specifically with exclusive or quasi-exclusive supply or distribution 
arrangements. 
1994] EC MERGER CONTROL 27 
Fortunately, until now, such analytical conflicts have been avoided 
in the Commission decisions because none of the vertical links 
considered were deemed to pose a risk of market coordination. The 
two cases examined thus far involved supply and distribution ar-
rangements, which will now be reviewed below. 
i. Supply links 
Until now, Commission decisions pertaining to supplying the joint 
venture's product to the parents have involved only non-exclusive 
agreements having no definite duration. Within this context, the 
Commission has held, on one occasion, that the non-exclusivity of 
the supply commitment, which gave the joint venture liberty to 
supply the relevant product to third parties, eliminated the possibil-
ity of coordination between the joint venture and the parent to be 
supplied.138 In a subsequent case, the Commission examined not 
only the percentage of the joint venture's production to be supplied 
to the parents, but also the percentage of the parents' purchases of 
the relevant product from the joint venture, and concluded that 
there was no risk of market coordination.139 
ii. Distribution 
In several cases, the Commission considered whether the distribu-
tion of the joint venture's product by one of its parents may lead to 
market coordination between the venture and such parent. In Lu-
cas/Eaton, the parent concerned would distribute no more than 15 
percent of the joint ven ture 's total sales. 140 In Varta/Bosch, the parent 
concerned would act as a commissioned agent for some of the joint 
venture's products, but only upon the specific authorization of the 
venture. 141 In each instance, the Commission held that such vertical 
links did not pose a risk of coordination of the competitive behavior 
of the parent concerned and the joint venture. 
138Courtaulds/SNIA, Comm'n Dec., 19 Dec. 1991, ~ 7 ("because of its non-exclusive nature, 
this [supply] agreement is not expected to limit the autonomy of the joint venture"). 
139 Volvo/ Atlas, Comm'n Dec., 14 Jan. 1992. In this case, the joint venture was to acquire 
the hydraulic component operations of Volvo and Atlas and, subsequently, was to supply its 
parents with limited quantities of these components amounting to between 5-11 % of the joint 
venture's sales of these products and less than 0.5% of the purchases of each of the parents. 
The vertical relationships were therefore deemed insignificant. [d. 
140Lucas/Eaton, Comm'n Dec., 9 Dec. 1991, 'l[ 12. 
141 Varta/Bosch, Comm'n Dec., 31 July 1991, ~ 5. 
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III. COMMENTARY 
The Commission's widening of the scope of "concentrative" joint 
ventures is likely to have serious consequences, some more obvious 
than others. From a public relations standpoint, the Commission is 
sending a message that some joint ventures which ordinarily would 
have been "cooperative" in nature, and therefore subject to article 
85, may now be judged exclusively by the MCR. This is probably 
welcome news to most companies seeking quick and efficient clear-
ance of their joint ventures. It must be kept in mind, however, that 
applying the MCR to "concentrative" joint ventures also entails a 
mandatory notification to the EC Merger Task Force.142 Therefore, 
in exchange for obtaining the security of the MCR, companies would 
relinquish their freedom not to notify those joint ventures which 
have become "concentrative" as a result of the MCR. 
More importantly, however, the Commission's new tendency to 
characterize joint ventures as "concentrative" threatens to destroy 
the boundary line between "concentrative" and "cooperative" full-
function joint ventures. In BAT v. Commission (the Philip Morris 
judgment) ,143 which involved the acquisition by Philip Morris of a 
minority shareholder of its competitor, Rothmans International, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that article 85(1) applied to 
such acquisitions where the agreement "provides for commercial 
cooperation between the companies or creates a structure likely to 
be used for such cooperation."I44 This approach could be traced 
back to the 1966 Memorandum of the Commission145 in which it 
stated that article 85(1) applied to both acquisitions and joint ven-
tures that result in "no permanent change in the ownership but a 
coordination of the market behaviour of firms remaining economi-
cally independent."I46 The Commission's subsequent policy was to 
regard joint ventures as "concentrative" only where both parents had 
merged one or more of their existing activities and withdrawn per-
manently and irreversibly from such activities.147 If either parent 
company failed to withdraw, the Commission viewed it as a potential 
competitor of the other parent or of the joint venture, thereby 
142MCR, supra note 1, art. 4(1). 
143 BAT v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487. 
144 [d. (emphasis added). 
145 See generally COMM'N, COMPETITION SERIES No.2, THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION IN THE COMMON MARKET (1966). 
146 [d. at Part III, " 14-15. 
147 See SHV jChevron, 1975 OJ. (L 38) 14, 15, 1 C.M.L.R. D68 (1975). 
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placing the agreement within the ambit of article 85 (1). For these 
purposes, it did not matter whether the non-withdrawing parent 
operated in a geographic market distant from that of the other 
parent or the joint venture. In the Commission's view, the coordi-
nation of competitive behavior was possible because a working struc-
ture already existed. 
In its practice under the MCR, the Commission has been applying 
a commercial realism approach in determining the potential for 
market coordination between the parent companies or between one 
of them as the joint venture. The Commission's results have been 
inconsistent and confused, however. In cases such as Steetley/Tar-
mac148 and Sanofi/Sterling Drug,149 the Commission emphasized the 
existence of technical and economic barriers which discouraged 
exports from the United States to the EC.150 It is questionable, 
however, whether the existence of barriers which may be overcome 
by determined competitors is sufficient to justifY a "concentrative" 
characterization of ajoint venture. For example, in Steetley/Tarmac, 
the unreasonable transport costs incurred in shipping bricks from 
the United States to the EC could have been overcome by the 
construction of manufacturing facilities in the Community. Simi-
larly, a high tariff barrier imposed on Japanese photocopiers as the 
result of an anti-dumping investigation should not eliminate Japa-
nese producers as potential competitors, particularly when direct 
investment in the EC is a foreseeable option. Likewise, Sanofi sug-
gests that customer loyalty to certain OTC trademarks could pose 
an economic barrier to a U.S. drug manufacturer re-entering the 
EC market, even though such loyalty is not an insuperable barrier. 
It is submitted that the Commission's reliance on barriers to entry 
in determining whether joint ventures are "concentrative" intellec-
tually is flawed. This test, which is well-suited for determining 
whether conditions of competition are homogeneous, is not appro-
priate for assessing the likelihood of residual coordination between 
the parties to a joint venture or between one of them and the joint 
venture. The Commission's fluid approach also has opened the door 
to further deterioration of the "concentrative"-"cooperative" line, 
as is reflected in Mondi/Frantschach. 151 Here, one of the parents, 
Mondi, was in the same product and geographic market as the joint 
148Steetly/Tarmac, Comm'n Dec., 10June 1991. 
149 Sanofi/Sterling, Comm'n Dec., 10 June 1991. 
150 ld. 
151 Mondi/Frantschach, Comm'n Dec., 12 May 1992. 
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venture. The Commission cited Mondi's nominal sales in the EC and 
South Mrica and concluded that Mondi would not continue selling 
the product in the Community. The Commission did not consider 
that Mondi had the choice of increasing its exports to the Commu-
nity.152 Indeed, contrary to the Commission's view, it would seem 
that Mondi's arrangement with the Hartmann/Kaufmann family 
enabled Mondi to share markets with the joint venture. On the other 
hand, in Apollinaris/Schweppes,153 the Commission found that absent 
barriers to entry, Cadbury Schweppes could have re-entered the 
German mineral water market from the United Kingdom. Based on 
Mondi, however, the Commission could have held the joint venture 
was "concentrative" because it was unlikely that Cadbury Schweppes 
would have competed with its own joint venture. 
The Commission's lack of coherence in applying the article 3(2) 
tailpiece coincides, unfortunately, with the prevailing lack of reliable 
criteria for determining whether parties to a "cooperative" joint 
venture are, under article 85(1), potential competitors.154 In both 
cases, the Commission has abandoned transparent tests in favor of 
some loose concept of commercial realism. The result has been the 
kind of circular reasoning shown in decisions such as BBG Brown 
Boven.155 In that case, NGK, aJapanese ceramics manufacturer, was 
deemed a potential competitor of its battery joint venture with BBC 
Brown Boveri on the ground that NGK would have obtained access 
to the battery technology from the joint venture itself. 
In its calibration of the MCR to apply to greater numbers of joint 
ventures, as in its unpredictable application of the notion of poten-
tial competition under article 85 (1), the Commission sends the 
wrong signals to companies planning joint ventures. While provid-
ing greater access to the more swift and certain procedure of the 
MCR, the Commission is undermining the Regulation by placing 
jurisdictional questions on a foundation of shifting sands. This is not 
only undesirable for purposes of the reliable application of the 
MCR, but also paves the way for the intrusion of arbitrary decision-
making. The other side effect of the Commission's new policy is that 
it places "concentrative" joint ventures not having a "Community 
dimension" outside the scrutiny of the Commission, even though 
152 See id. 
153Appollinaris/Schweppes, Comm'n Dec., 24 June 1991, ~ 222. 
154 See Fine, EC Commissian's Guidelines for Joint Ventures: In Search of a Cohesive Policy, INT'L 
Bus. LAWYER 351 Ouly/Aug.1992). 
155 1988 OJ. (L 30l) 68. 
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the transaction may have significant anti-competitive effects in sev-
eral Member States. Many smaller joint ventures which have become 
"concentrative" only as the result of the new Commission policy 
would have been subject to article 85 in pre-MCR practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Since it is now inconceivable that the Commission would place its 
"concentrative" genie back into a "cooperative" bottle, it should 
work toward providing a more cogent means of distinguishing "con-
centrative" and "cooperative" joint ventures. How far beyond the 
historical concept of partial mergers may the definition of "concen-
trative" joint ventures be stretched and still remain credible? Part of 
the solution may be to exclude the application of the MCR to joint 
ventures. For example, in Elf/Enterprise, one or more parents re-
mained in the same product and geographic markets as the joint 
venture. The problem then becomes how to treat situations in which 
one (or both) of the parties remains in the same or neighboring 
product market of the joint venture, but is in a different geographic 
market. Where there are no barriers to entry, the logic of Apolli-
nans/Schweppes should apply to characterize the joint venture as 
"cooperative." Is the mere existence of technical, legal, or economic 
barriers sufficient to guarantee the absence of coordination of the 
competitive behavior of the parties? In theory, there are no such 
assurances, and in such cases, a transmutation of "cooperative" joint 
ventures into "concentrative" operations will have taken place. The 
best that one could hope for in such cases is that the Commission 
would apply hard, transparent criteria. This at least minimizes the 
probability of a party overcoming the applicable barrier to entry 
and, at the same time, safeguards the integrity of the Commission's 
new commercial realism approach. Such a compromise, however, is 
not likely to satisfY the purists, and pragmatists may soon find that 
the only barrier separating "cooperative" and "concentrative" ven-
tures is a Chinese wall. 
